Session 5b: Responding to the Holocaust
Chair: Alan Udoff
The Monstrosity of Auschwitz in Wanda Jakubowska’s The
Last Stage (1948)
Marek Haltof
English Department, Northern
Michigan University, Marquette, USA
Given the complexities of the Polish past, it comes as no surprise
that memories of World War II haunt Polish cinema and, like many traumatic
experiences, return powerfully on the screen.
In her landmark film Ostatni
etap (The Last Stage,
aka The Last Stop, 1948), Wanda Jakubowska shows the monstrosity
of Auschwitz and draws on her firsthand experiences while portraying
the “factory of death” (she was interned in Auschwitz and Ravensbrück).
With its dramatization of the camp experience, The Last Stage establishes
several images easily discernible in subsequent Holocaust narratives:
the dark, “realistic” images of the camp (the film was shot in Auschwitz);
the passionate moralistic appeal; and the clear divisions between victims
and victimizers.
Today, in spite of its powerful imagery, The Last
Stage may
seem archaic and artificial, in line with the official cultural policy
and the dominant aesthetic modes of the late 1940s. Yet its depiction
of Nazi concentration camps (e.g., morning and evening roll calls on
the Appellplatz) are present in a number of subsequent American
films, including Sophie's Choice (1982, Alan Pakula) and Schindler's
List (1993, Steven Spielberg). Certainly, to this day The
Last Stage remains a seminal film about the Holocaust, a prototype
for future Holocaust cinematic narratives.
The paper focuses on this
internationally acclaimed film, which also marks the birth of the Polish
post-war cinema. It discusses both the strengths and weaknesses of The
Last Stage , which are also
inherent in many later projects that aimed at the impossible task of
re-creating the horror of the Holocaust. Also, the focus is on political
and aesthetic problems the film's director, Wanda Jakubowska, faced
while making her film.
A Chasidic Anti-Theodicy: Rabbi Shapira’s Response to the
Nazi Evil
David Patterson
Bornblum Judaic Studies, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, USA
Drawing upon a work composed during the Holocaust in order to account
for evil from a post-Holocaust perspective, this paper will examine
Rabbi Kalonymos Kalmish Shapira's Sacred Fire, a response
to the catastrophe written from the depths of the Warsaw Ghetto (September
1939 – July 1942). Of particular interest is Rabbi Shapira's reflection
on the withdrawal of the divine in the contexts of an assault on the
divine. Arguing that existing Jewish responses to the evil of the Shoah
have been ill-defined, the paper will show how Rabbi Shapira opens
up new possibilities for understanding of radical evil.
First the paper
will explain Chasidic views of evil as the formation of kelipot or “shells” that
hide the divine spark within creation. It will show that these kelipot are
predominantly characterized by the ego and ego-based thought, such
as the ontological, totalizing thought that belongs the Nazi Weltanschauung .
Next the paper will explain Rabbi Shapria's account of evil in terms
of Chasidic theology. Here Rabbi Shapira draws upon ancient sources
to show that the radical evil of the Nazis lies in an attempt to destroy
the G-d of Abraham—that is, the divine spark that constitutes the human
image—by annihilating the Chosen of G-d.
Drawing on talmudic and mystical
teaching, the paper will then show that evil during and after the Holocaust
lies in a retreat of the Divine in the face of (1) an assault upon
His witnesses and (2) a post-Holocaust turning away from that assault
on the part of many scholars, thinkers, intellectuals, and other leaders.
Finally, the paper elaborates on how this Chasidic “theodicy” actually
undermines theodicy by placing the power of evil in human hands, not
in divine providence.
Judgements about 'Bystander' Behaviour
Gideon Calder
Centre for Applied Social and Philosophical Studies, University of Wales,
Newport
‘Bystanders' at the scene of acts of moral extremity are, by the nature
of the term, connected to it: situated in more or less proximate relation
to those to whose suffering they are not attending. Yet the space between – social,
cultural, moral – tends not to feature centrally in diagnoses of responsibility
and guilt. This paper seeks to explore two main questions. Firstly:
whether the moral and cultural ‘relationality' of bystanders' acts
and omissions makes any difference to judgements as to the ‘evilness'
of such behaviour. Might there, for instance, be a non-facile sense
in which in the notion that being a bystander amid acts of atrocity
is a kind of moral bad luck – to which the honest response, from those
not so situated, is that ‘there but for the grace of God go I?' And
secondly, the idea that ‘evil' might be applied as much as to relations
between individuals, as to the thoughts and actions of individuals
themselves. Using recent work by Stanley Cohen and Norman Geras as
reference points, I argue not
only that there is sense in this idea, but that it offers a greater
depth of explanation than a ‘methodologically individualist' conception
of evil, by itself, is able to.
The point here is not to dilute the force
of any judgement of evil-doing on the part of given individuals, nor
to erode the sense of individual responsibility for action. Rather,
it is to say that if, with St Augustine, we understand evil primarily
as an absence (rather than some
natural part of the furniture of life which must either be extinguished
or accommodated to) then this quality of ‘lack', of the privation of
the worth of being, is as much a feature of social relations in societies
where atrocities are taking place as it is of the characters of the
individuals concerned. Thus the moral position of the ‘bystander' should
be understood not simply in terms of their relation to those who are
suffering, but also in terms of the relation of both to the moral climate
which their society is, or has been operating. Here I endorse (with
qualifications) Geras's identification of a ‘contract of mutual indifference':
a feature of liberal culture which, married with the socio-economic
context of late capitalism, makes for a situation in which ‘bystanderism'
is less an accident, or aberration, than a tendency inherent to the
moral climate of the age.